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Sometimes Watergate seems doomed to be trivialized or, at best, only
memorialized on "significant" anniversaries. Richard Nixon has sought
desperately to induce national amnesia, but being Richard Nixon he can
succeed only in part. Indeed, his very presence has the perverse effect of
eventually reminding us of what he did.
Richard Nixon eventually will leave us, and then what do we do to
commemorate and learn from Watergate? For nearly two decades, the
record has been dismal. In 1992, the media was awash in an orgy of
recapitulation, speculation, and inevitable inaccuracy, as it marked the
twentieth anniversary of the burglary. Convicted felon G. Gordon Liddy,
who has made a career implicating the criminality and involvement of
others, seems to be a required presence in any of these memorializationsillustrating once again that the media does not recognize what is anything
but a fine line between news and entertainment. The usual suspects appear-Colson, Ehrlichman, and Haldeman, for example-to put their special
twist on past events. Never mind that they use such occasions to backstab
one another (carrying on a fine old Nixon White House tradition), but they
also manage periodically to make new allegations, much of it grist for
publishing proposals. Did Nixon have advance knowledge of the break-in?
The writings and public comments of the late H. R. Haldeman will give you
a wide array of answers. Yes, Nixon knew; no, he did not-whatever it
takes to sell. After all, Haldeman made his fortune in advertising (while
being the heir to a plumbing fortune).
If the media is to be believed, Watergate's most enduring impact seems
to be the legacy of a suffix. References to Nixon's deeds and the Watergate
controversy soon became a shorthand for amorality, abuse of power, and
official criminality. "Watergate" provided a ready suffix for a range of
public scandals. And thus: Koreagate, Irangate, Iraqgate, Debategate, and
even more recently, Nannygate and Whitewatergate. The language became
global when the Japanese used "Recruitgate" to describe a government
scandal in the late 1980s. Watergate encouraged a routinized response to
official breaches of public law and confidence. I am disappointed, but not
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surprised, by the media's incessant trivialization of an event of such
transcendent importance.
Watergate, in fact, served as a prescription to alter the political and
legal landscape (not always successfully, of course) in the United States, and
it became a standard for analyzing political behavior. It did not halt or
decisively reverse the long-term trend toward greater executive power and
responsibility. Eight years after Nixon's resignation, the Supreme Court
upheld presidential immunity in civil cases, and warned against the "dangers
of intrusion" on presidential authority and functions. But the perceived
abuses of power during the Nixon presidency led to various "reforms,"
ranging from attempts to institutionalize the special prosecutor, to curbs on
presidential manipulation of executive agencies for personal political gain,
to new campaign-financing laws. Watergate had a substantial influence on
the political parties and political ideology. It also profoundly affected the
foreign policy of the Nixon Administration, with consequences for the future
as well.
As symbol and memory, Watergate shaped public discourse even when
distorted or exaggerated. In 1980, Ronald Reagan attacked a federal court
ruling against abortion restrictions as "an abuse of power" as bad as
Watergate. Senator Edward Kennedy criticized President Reagan in 1987
for reaching into the "muck of Watergate" to nominate Judge Robert H.
Bork to the Supreme Court. Bork was never able to shake his image as a
bloody accomplice, however innocent, to the events of October 1973; he
had, Kennedy charged, executed 'the unconscionable assignment" of firing
Archibald Cox, "one of the darkest chapters for the rule of law in American
history." In 1986, Richard Nixon, serenely confident that he had been
"rehabilitated," suddenly found Watergate alive and well, hauntingly
compared to the Iran-Contra affair that erupted that fall. Watergate proved
to be more than the "dim and distant curiosity" that one historian described.'
We have an abiding interest in the "lessons" of history. In this case,
that would center on whether Watergate provided any enduring changes or
reforms. The verdict at best is mixed. Perhaps, then, it is best to focus on
how Watergate touched American society, and what it meant, in an
immediate sense.
Watergate's impact involved a sweeping range of so-called reform
legislation. But Watergate is, as I said, an event of transcendent importance;
1. WatergateisAlreadya Dim and DistantCuriosity,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
13, 1984, at 59; N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1980, at ]; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
754 (1982); 133 CONG. REcs. 9188-89 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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it consumed the nation's attention for nearly two years. Inevitably, the
events of Watergate affected the nation's institutions, politics, and perceptions of itself in a variety of areas, foreign as well as domestic.
Watergate profoundly shaped struggles for leadership and ideological
control in the major political parties. Richard Nixon's fall from grace
strengthened the claims of Republican conservative ideologues, who had
captured the party in 1964 only to find their goals frustrated by the rise of
the "pragmatic" Nixon. At the same time, Watergate spurred the elections
of Democrats bent on a reform agenda for the political process, yet who had
virtually no cohesive program for national policies. Perceived at first as a
Democratic triumph and a Republican debacle, Watergate, in reality,
facilitated the conservative takeover that reinvigorated the Republican Party,
and although the Democrats temporarily profited, they left unattended the
fissures in their old coalition and ignored the need for fashioning programs
that would reverse the corrosion of that coalition.
Barry Goldwater's 1964 defeat left the Republican conservatives no
alternative but Nixon in 1968. Yet, when President Nixon reached out for
rapprochement with China and as his domestic programs mounted deficits
and produced inflation, conservatives found themselves politically estranged.
For conservatives, Watergate discredited Nixon personally; it also dealt a
blow to the "middle ground" in the Republican Party that Nixon had
preempted in the 1960s between the liberal Rockefeller forces and the
Goldwater Right. With Nixon's departure and Ford's defeat in 1976, the
conservative movement captured the field against the relatively feeble
challenges from its intra-party foes.
Except for the brief Ashbrook insurrection in the 1972 primaries, conservatives had muted their criticism of Nixon, confining it to occasional
attacks on isolated policies. But with Nixon's resignation, conservatives
launched an ideological assault on his overall policies, and excoriated Ford
for maintaining them. William Buckley assailed Nixon for the "humiliating
defeat" in Vietnam, for a budget deficit "larger than any Democrat ever
dared to endorse," and for the "baptism of d6tente" with its attendant talk
of the "peace-loving intentions of the Communist superpowers." Other
conservatives blamed Nixon for passing strategic superiority to the Soviets,
for sowing the seeds of economic destruction because of his inability to
make difficult choices, for dismantling the American Navy, and for
expanding the Great Society contrary to his campaign promises. Foolishly,
according to such sources, Nixon believed that if he appeased the Left on
policy matters, he would have a respite from his Watergate difficulties.
As President Ford continued the same policies, conservatives disdained
party loyalty and spurned an incumbent they had once admired. In May
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1975, Ronald Reagan condemned Ford for a projected fifty-one million
dollar budget deficit. Conservative Digest reported a poll in June of 1975
claiming that seventy-one percent of its readers thought Ford was doing a
"poor" job, and ninety-one percent opposed his nomination for the 1976
election.'
The conservative fury nearly resulted in denying the 1976 Republican
nomination to Ford, an event that would have been unprecedented in the
twentieth century. Senators James Buckley and Pat Buchanan called for an
"open convention." The conservatives massed behind a Reagan candidacy
and failed to carry it through only by a scant margin; many believed that a
second ballot would have given the nod to the former California Governor.
When Reagan spoke to the 1975 Conservative Political Action Conference,
he invoked the sacred appeal of the "Mandate of 1972," a mandate that
conservatives believed had been given to them to implement their political
and social agenda, and not to be used by Nixon personally. The election,
they claimed, had emphatically repudiated the ideology of "radicalism" and
"social permissiveness" that had captured the Democratic Party. "The
mandate of 1972 still exists," Reagan proclaimed. "The people of America
have been confused and disturbed by events since that election, but they
hold an unchanged philosophy." Reagan and his advisers held to that faith.
In the 1980 campaign, they used the conservative indictment against Nixon
and Ford to telling effect against a Democratic President. Ironically, as
President Reagan concluded his second term in 1988, conservative
spokesmen, such as Buchanan, once more assailed the nation's continued
"leftward drift." '3
Richard Nixon's Republican opponents finally enjoyed a measure of revenge. Periodically, he invoked conservative slogans and labels, but he
remained a distrusted and embarrassing figure, even to his own party. The
former President had the unique distinction of not being invited to the four
Republican presidential nominating conventions that followed his leaving the
White House. When President Clinton invited Nixon to the White House
in March 1993, the press was given no access.
Watergate swelled the ranks of congressional Democrats in the 1974

2. William F. Buckley, Jr.,ReaganforChallengerNAT'LREv., Sept. 12, 1975, at 1008;
HUMAN EVENTs, Dec. 7, 1974, at 14; CONSERVATIVE DIG., May 1975, at 3, June 1975, at

39; Interview with Howard Phillips (Aug. 23, 1985); Interview with Barber Conable (May
28, 1985).
3. Patrick Buchanan, A Long March Unfulfilled, WASH.TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1988, at 18;
HUMAN EVENTS, June 21, 1975, at4, July 19, 1975, at 7, Nov. 24, 1974, at 3, Mar. 1, 1975,
at 5; Interview with David Keene (Aug. 14, 1985).
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and 1976 elections. In 1974, at the height of interest in the scandal, the
Democrats added seventy-five new members to the House, most of whom
promised electoral reform. In the meantime, however, the attention given
to procedural reforms ignored the growing schisms in the Democratic Party,
schisms that reflected changing social and economic concerns among the
electorate. The 1972 election pointed to the growing strains within the
party; Watergate, however, obscured, then postponed, any real understanding
or reckoning of the party's dilemmas. "The Real Majority," political
analysts warned, no longer consisted of the "have-nots" who had formed the
basis for Democratic coalitions for more than forty years. The "haves" had
new concerns, which made the Democratic Party's "politics of inclusion"
paradoxical, even contradictory.'
Many of the new Democrats represented marginal districts, often suburban, middle-class, and domesticated to the politics of affluence. The
programmatic concerns of the AFL-CIO, minority coalitions, and women's
groups had limited appeal in such districts. The reform-minded new representatives struck a Faustian bargain: the Democratic leadership gave them
their "reform" proposals but demanded that they toe the line on policy
concerns originating in the party's traditional constituencies. The newcomers' support for the leadership's desired social and economic policies only
aroused organized opposition in their local districts from pro-business organizations, as well as from ideological groups demanding a reduced welfare
state and support for anti-abortion measures.
Jimmy Carter rode to victory in 1976 on promises of greater morality
and efficiency in government. "We were responsible for Jimmy Carter,"
Richard Nixon admitted in 1977V The historical accident of Watergate
produced President Carter, but unlike the Great Depression, Watergate by
itself was not an issue that could sustain power. Carter seemed to offer little
in the way of a program that would broadly appeal to the nation; his
seeming aimlessness reflecting the Democrats' lack of cohesiveness and
purpose. Altogether, the situation was a prescription for disaster, particularly as inflation corroded the earning power of the Democrats' electoral base.
Meanwhile, the Republicans united behind Ronald Reagan, a candidate who
attractively expressed the conservative ideology which had been dominant

4.

RICHARD SCAMMON & BENJAMIN J. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY (1970);

KEviN P. PHILLIPS,

POST-CONSERVATIVE AMERICA (1982); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS
(1983), and especially, THOMAS B. EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF

OF TiE PARTY SYSTEM

EQUALITY (1984), offer useful insights into the dilemmas of the Democrats.
5. DAVID FROST, "I GAVE THEM A SWORD": BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE NIXON
INrERVIEWS 62 (1978).
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in the party since 1964 but which had always lacked a charismatic leader.
Reagan led his party to two presidential triumphs and a six-year control of
the Senate, and he successfully transferred his aura and image to George
Bush in 1988. Three consecutive presidential defeats left the Democrats
floundering in search of their identity as a party. Watergate diverted the
party from that quest and left it in disarray for nearly two decades.
Watergate spurred demands for "reform" to prevent future abuses of
power, as scandals inevitably do; paradoxically, however, the affair also
produced assertions that 'The system worked." In the spring of 1974, a
distinguished academic panel headed by Yale Law School professors
Alexander Bickel and Ralph Winter warned that Watergate was a "poor
vehicle" for addressing major reforms. The panel's report contended that
both existing law and legal institutions had responded adequately to the
crisis. The Watergate scandal had been that of an individual and not of the
political-legal system itself. Yet the panelists warned that reducing
presidential power required Congress to reform itself and to accept its proper
responsibilities for shared governance, rather than damaging the institution
of the presidency. Watergate, they concluded, might result in "history less
in danger of being ignored than misunderstood."6
Still, the temptation to rectify lawbreaking with more law was
irresistible. Ethical standards, guidelines for institutional behavior, restraints
on power, and the enforcement of the new rules flowed from Congress in
the aftermath of Watergate. The results produced years of bickering over
the meaning of the reforms and the willingness to follow them. Samuel
Johnson once characterized patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel.
Roscoe Conkling, a scandal-plagued nineteenth-century Senator, added that
Johnson had "underestimated the potential of reform."
In the years since Watergate, Congress has flirted with reform
legislation essentially focusing on ethical considerations or on the nature of
the political process. For the latter, it seems nothing has been as futile as
campaign financing legislation, ironically, the original subject of the Senate
Watergate investigation.' The 1992 elections ended the partisan division

6.

RALPH WINTER, JR., WATERGATE AND THE LAW:

POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND

PREsIDENTLAL POWER 1-4, 83-85 (1974).

7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); PublicFinancingof Federal
Elections:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on PrivilegesandElectionsofthe Comm. on Rules
and Administration,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 33, 35 (1973); Congress Clears Campaign
FinanceReform, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 611-33 (1974); HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING
THE 1972 ELEcnoN (1976); GILLIAN PEELE, REVIVAL AND REACTION:
THE RIGHT IN
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between the Executive and Legislative branches, offering some prospect that
the two-decade long gridlock on this subject might be broken.
The institutionalization of the Independent Counsel, formerly known as
the Special Prosecutor, probably is the most visible and controversial
remnant of Watergate. The reality of divided government in 1973 forced
Richard Nixon to accept the idea of a Special Prosecutor, who was to be
independent of the Justice Department, free to carry on his own investigations. After the President summarily dismissed Archibald Cox, Congress
and Leon Jaworski pushed for firmer guarantees of independence for the
Special Prosecutor. When the Nixon Administration raised substantial
constitutional objections centering on separation-of-powers doctrine, the
move to some observers seemed to be merely a ploy to limit the authority
of the Special Prosecutor.8
One year after the House Judiciary Committee had voted to impeach
Nixon, Congress first considered institutionalizing the Office of Special
Prosecutor and codifying ethical standards. In 1978 Congress passed the
Ethics in Government Act, a law that perhaps more than any other
symbolized the lingering concerns of Watergate. When Congress first
considered the bill in 1975, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) declared that
Congress had the responsibility to prevent future Watergates. In a
subsequent hearing, a Justice Department official acknowledged, "in the
shadow of Watergate . . . the appearance of justice is almost as important
as justice itself."
The 1978 ethics law required financial disclosures by executive and
judicial branch officials, although not by members of Congress. The law
restrained the "revolving door" through which public officials readily moved
into the private sector and immediately used knowledge and contacts gained
in their previous positions for private gain. The act established the Office
of Government Ethics to monitor its financial disclosure and conflict-ofinterest provisions.
Demands for such reforms antedated Watergate. But Watergate
specifically inspired the creation of mechanisms for judicial appointment of

CONTEMPORARY A.MERICA 60 (1984); Gregg Easterbrook, What's Wrong with Congress?

THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57; see also Paul Huston, Fat Cat Contributionsin the 1988
Campaign, L.A. TMEs, Dec. 9, 1988. The disclosure requirements of the 1974 legislation
have remained largely intact and have provided useful information as to the source of
campaign funds.
8. ROBERT NISBET, THE PRESENT AGE:

PROGRESS AND ANARCHY IN MODERN

AMERICA 105-06 (1988); Leon Jaworski, Oral HistoryMemoir,in THE TEXAS COLLECTION,
5 BAYLOR UNIV. 764-65.
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a special prosecutor to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by officials of
the Executive branch. The 1978 law required the Attorney General to
investigate such allegations and then to report to a three-judge panel within
ninety days on whether the charges were unfounded or whether the judges
should appoint a special prosecutor. The judges defined the prosecutor's
jurisdiction. Once selected, the prosecutor had authority to perform the
investigative and prosecutorial functions of Justice Department officials.
Finally, the prosecutor could not be removed, except by impeachment,
conviction of a crime, physical incapacity, or by the Attorney General in the
event of extraordinary impropriety. The Attorney General must justify such
action to the Senate Judiciary Committee; moreover, the prosecutor might
appeal to the courts for review. The Ethics Act institutionalized the memory
of the Saturday Night Massacre.
The measure passed both houses overwhelmingly. Congressman
Charles Wiggins, however, sounding what some viewed as irrelevant sour
notes from the past, led a corporals' guard of resistance in the House. He
was joined, interestingly enough, by Robert McClory and Caldwell Butler,
both of whom had voted to impeach Nixon. The minority contended that
the government's prosecutorial machinery had not broken down, that
Watergate was exceptional and did not justify the creation of a new
mechanism. "If an attorney general cannot be trusted to enforce the law
against the executive," the minority contended, "tfhe remedy is impeachment
and not the cloning of an additional attorney general to do the job of the
first." The responsibility, in short, rested with Congress. Henry Petersen,
who regretted his "slowness" in recognizing the necessity for a special
prosecutor in 1973, nevertheless opposed the bill as well, believing that
"political safety" too often would result in narrowing prosecutorial
discretion, with unfair consequences to the accused. 9
Two Carter Administration officials became the first targets of the
Ethics in Government Act, as a result of allegations of drug use and
conflicts of interest. The lengthy, predictably sensational investigations
resulted in no charges. Doubtless, their ordeals impaired the reputations and
undermined the effectiveness of both men. When Congress reviewed the
operation of the law in 1981, disenchantment was apparent, particularly
marked by complaints that the special prosecutor provisions were too easily

9. WatergateReorganizationand Reform Act of 1975: HearingsBefore the Comm. on
Government Operations,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); PublicOfficialslntegrityAct of 1977:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 1stSess. (1977); Carter
Signs Government-Wide Ethics Bill, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 835-45 (1978); Interview with
Henry Petersen (August 23, 1975).
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triggered. Former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, who had served
under Carter, warned that "we have selected a weapon which must be used
with greater care." He argued that the Justice Department could have
conducted the necessary investigations of Carter's men and that applying the
law against 480 Executive branch officials was simply too broad and
expensive.
The Reagan Administration opposed the Ethics in Government Act as
well, and focused on constitutional and cost objections. Judicial appointments of prosecutors, the Justice Department contended, involved executive
functions but did not allow executive control, an unconstitutional arrangement. But the need for a special prosecutor to provide the "appearance of
justice" still had a powerful appeal. The Reagan Administration eventually
dropped its opposition, although it proposed a wider latitude for removal of
the prosecutor. Interestingly, the Justice Department suggested adding the
President's friends and family as objects of attention of a special prosecutor.
Two years of wrangling produced a series of amendments to the Ethics Act
in 1983. The changes renamed the Special Prosecutor an "Independent
Counsel" (a less "inflammatory" title, one Senator suggested). The changes
gave the Attorney General more discretion in the decision to name a
counsel, reduced the list of officials who might be investigated, provided for
reimbursement of attorney's fees for the subject of an investigation if no
indictment was brought, and allowed the Attorney General to remove the
counsel for "good cause." 10
Four years later, the legislation again had to be revised. By then more
than half a dozen independent counsel investigations had been launched.
Now the Reagan Administration openly opposed continuation of the office.
Attorney General William French Smith assailed the independent counsel
process as "probably unconstitutional." He believed it negated the ends of
justice and that it was "cruel and devastating in its application to individuals,
falsely destroying reputations and requiring the incurring of great personal
costs." The investigations, he contended, resulted in media circuses and had
yielded little at high cost to the taxpayers. Democratic senators accused the
Administration of "re-interpreting" and weakening the law when it refused
to apply the act on several occasions. For its part, the Administration

10. SpecialProsecutorProvisionsofEthicsin
GovernmentAct of1978: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Oversightof Government Management of the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof Government Management of the Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982); Revision of Special ProsecutorLaw
Cleared,CONG. Q. ALMANAC 386-89 (1982).
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stressed the unconstitutionality of the system. But pending investigations
only strengthened the opposition to changes. Meanwhile, the Administration
offered regular Justice Department appointments to the then-acting
independent counsels on a dual basis, pending the settlement of court
challenges to the constitutionality of the position.
Watergate reverberated as Congress debated extending the Ethics Act
in 1987. The bill's chief Senate sponsor, Carl Levin (D-MI), had no
illusions about the Reagan Administration's real attitudes. The Reagan
Justice Department, he complained, "would have us return to the days of
Watergate and Nixon's 'Saturday Night Massacre' when public trust in our
criminal justice system hung in the balance. We don't want to go to the
brink again." On June 17th, the fifteenth anniversary of the Watergate
break-in, the Justice Department reiterated its opinion that all prosecutors
must be responsible to the President. During the Senate debate in October,
Levin reminded his colleagues that Watergate had raised doubts about the
integrity and independence of criminal investigations directed at the
President and his entourage. Since then, the statutory arrangements for an
independent counsel, Levin insisted, had won wide acceptance from the
American people. The ready support for an independent counsel in the
pending Iran-Contra affair contrasted sharply with the "public's consternation over the Watergate investigation," demonstrating that the arrangement
had restored "public confidence in the integrity" of the criminal-justice
system. 'That is an invaluable achievement," Levin concluded.
The renewal measure passed overwhelmingly by a margin making it
vetoproof and Reagan signed it on December 15, despite Justice Department
opposition. Given four pending investigations of the President's actions as
well as those of his advisers, the "appearance of justice" compelled him to
sign the bill. Coincidentally, one day later, an Independent Counsel secured
the first conviction under the Ethics Act when a jury found Michael Deaver
guilty of perjury. Michael Deaver was a former White House aide who had
close personal ties to President Reagan and his wife. After Deaver's
conviction, Independent Counsel Whitney North Seymour complained that
the Ethics in Government Act had too many loopholes and exemptions.
Whatever its inadequacies, the law nevertheless remained imperative, he
said, because there was 'too much loose money and too little concern in
Washington about ethics in government." Seymour assaulted the Reagan
Administration's failure to instill an ethical sense throughout the government. Critics from another direction used the occasion to chastise Congress
again for having immunized its members from outside investigations for
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violations of ethical standards."
With the open support of the Reagan Administration, individuals under
investigation pursued a constitutional challenge to the Office of Independent
Counsel. Three former Attorneys General and the Solicitor General lent
their considerable prestige to the campaign. The issue boiled down to
differences over the power of the Executive branch to conduct all criminal
prosecutions, on the one hand, and the significance of constitutional
language authorizing Congress to vest in the Judiciary the appointment of
"inferior officers," on the other. Left largely unspoken in the formal briefs
was any recognition of the importance of the "appearance of justice."
In January, 1988 the Court of Appeals, divided two-to-one, invalidated
the Independent Counsel provision as an unwarranted intrusion on Executive
authority. Speaking for the majority, Judge Lawrence Silberman articulated
a strict construction of separation of powers. The decision came down amid
growing doubts whether the independent counsel statute was workable.
Critics charged that the Counsels' investigations had become at times
outright harassment of public officials. Predictably, former Nixon aides
assailed what one called an "orgy of investigation" and "prosecutorial
politics." But even former members of the Cox and Jaworski staffs noted
that the independent counsel operations had become elephantine, given the
large expenditures and resources required for investigations, maintenance,
and security. Still, public support for the probe of the Iran-Contra affair
remained strong. Meanwhile, independent counsels secured convictions of
two more former Reagan aides, lending some weight to the idea that only
a disinterested prosecutor could proceed against the Executive branch.
The Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the independent counsel
statute in a surprisingly firm and broad decision.' 2 Reversing the appellate
court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist led the Court in rebuffing the
Administration. The Justices found no violation of separation of powers
doctrine. The Court held that the Ethics Act in no way inhibited the
President from performing his constitutionally assigned duties. 3 Unlike
the lower court, Rehnquist rejected any notion that the law constituted

11. SpecialProsecutorProvisionsofEthicsin
GovernmentActofl978: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof GovernmentManagement of the Comm. on
GovernmentalAjftairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982); Revision of Special ProsecutorLaw
Cleared,CONG. Q. ALMANAC 386-89 (1982).
12. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
13. Id. at 657.
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"Congressional usurpation" of executive functions. In a lone dissent, Justice
Antonin Scalia bitingly referred to "our former constitutional system," as he
lamented the Court's refusal to uphold what he believed to be a proper and
absolute scheme of separation of powers. 4
The Independent Counsel nevertheless remained the bane of both the
Reagan and Bush Administrations which made no secret of their desire to
abolish the office. Congressional Republicans kept up a steady drumfire of
criticism, particularly scoring the alleged excesses of Lawrence Walsh, who
headed the Iran-Contra investigation. Walsh was accused of lavishing
excessive amounts of money and, in effect, pursuing a vendetta against
President Bush and other figures. During the 1992 campaign, Walsh
presented new charges against former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
infuriating Bush and his party.
The Independent Counsel Law expired on December 15, 1992. Still,
three Independent Counsels remained in office continuing their investigations. Besides Walsh, Arlin Adams headed an investigation of Reagan's
Department of Housing and Urban Development and Joseph diGenova, who
was appointed just before the law expired, was exploring the State
Department's involvement in the search of President Clinton's passport files
during the election campaign. Subsequent disclosures of Clinton's possible
involvement in unethical business dealings prompted Republicans to demand
(and receive) an independent counsel to investigate the matter, but at the
same time, made it difficult for them to resist renewed pressures for the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Bill.
The charges that President Nixon had abused his office by improperly
using such powerful executive agencies as the FBI, the CIA, and the IRS
produced a sharp reaction in Congress and in the nation. Loosening
presidential controls, however, conceivably could enlarge the independence
of those same groups, a prospect that gave pause to those who had watched
the practically unbridled power of the bureaucracies.
The Watergate years brought into sharp relief the practices and

14. Id. at 697; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Leonard
Garment, Does America Really Need This Orgy of Investigation?WASH. POST, May 10,
1987, at B 1; Leonard Garment, The Guns of Watergate,COMMENTARY, Apr. 1987, at 20-23;
L. Gordon Crovitz, IndependentCounsels: Quo Warranto? WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at
38. In one article, the authors criticized the lack of accountability and excesses of the
Independent Counsel. See Andrew L. Frey & Kenneth S. Geller, Better Than Independent
Counsels, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1988, at C7 One author responded to the criticism. See
Lovida H. Coleman, Jr., The Casefor the IndependentCounsel, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1988,
at All.
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behavior of almost sacrosanct institutions. Questions and challenges to
authority invariably raised the issue of accountability. In the years
following Nixon's resignation, Congress periodically wrestled with that
problem, but it often backed away from fundamental reforms affecting the
structure or the role of the FBI, CIA, and IRS. That reluctance reflected the
prevailing views, either that the abuses discovered in the Watergate years
were mere aberrations, or that later transgressions were so minor that reform
might do more harm than good.
Clarence Kelley, who became FBI Director in 1973, thought that the
Watergate "nightmare" had served "as a much needed cleansing agent for
the Bureau," one that enabled him to initiate "long overdue reforms."
Responding to criticisms of the FBI counterintelligence program of the late
1960s and early 1970s, as well as to other allegations of misconduct often
sanctioned by J.Edgar Hoover, Kelley supposedly reduced the Bureau's role
in domestic intelligence probes and instituted wide-ranging organizational
changes. Kelley and the Carter Administration also sought a posthumous
verdict against the practices of the previous era when they brought criminal
indictments for unauthorized burglaries against two high ranking Hoover
aides. The FBI officials were convicted and fined in December 1980, but
they appealed the decision, and Reagan pardoned them. The President
contended that the officials had acted in the belief that their actions were
authorized at "the highest levels of govenment," and cited Carter's
"unconditional pardon" of those who had violated the Selective Service laws
during the Vietnam war.
Congress, in its fashion, sought to retaliate against Hoover when, in
1976, it established a ten-year term for future FBI directors. The impetus
for the limitation came from congressional concern both over Hoover's
excessive independence, developed over his nearly fifty-year reign, and over
the cooperation which Acting Director L. Patrick Gray had given to Nixon's
blatant political manipulation of the Bureau. The conflicting motives for
imposing the limited term passed almost unnoticed."5
15. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE
FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978) (best account of FBI's abuses of power);
CLARENCE KELLEY, KELLEY: THE STORY OF AN FBI DIRECTOR 152-53 (1987). Mark Felt,
one of the indicted agents, bitterly assailed Kelley and the reformist spirit, in THE FBI
PYRAMID: FROM THE INSIDE 345-51 (1979) ("The FBI wouldn't be in this predicament if
Clarence Kelley were alive," was, according to Felt, a favorite observation among FBI
personnel); see also Robert Pear, PresidentReaganPardons2 Ex-F.B.I. Officialsin 1970's
Break-Ins,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1981, at Al; RICHARD G. POWER, SECRECY AND POWER:
THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 487 (1987); WatergateRevisited: A Legislative Legacy,
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 387 (1982).
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Congressional investigations in 1975 had dramatically illustrated the
extent of FBI abuses of power and had demonstrated Hoover's willingness
to serve the political goals of different presidents, to ingratiate himself, and
to augment his power. But Congress failed to develop a legislative charter
defining proper FBI activities. Instead, in March 1976, Attorney General
Edward Levi established a series of guidelines to restrain FBI domestic
security investigations and prevent questionable activities.
Less than a decade later, the nation learned that the more things
changed, the more they remained the same. Attorney General William
French Smith announced that he had relaxed rules governing domestic
spying by the Bureau and claimed that the changes had enabled the
government to successfully combat domestic terrorism. A special American
Bar Association committee, composed of lawyers who had served on various
intelligence agencies, praised Smith's revisions of the Levi guidelines for
their "healthy degree of balance" between First Amendment rights and the
demands of domestic security. Yet it recommended some changes in
Smith's rules to "ensure that while the security goals ... are met, the civil
liberties of all of our citizens are protected." In a pointed eulogy, the report
praised Levi's work. Smith brushed off any implied criticism, claiming that
the ABA report merely reflected "issues of policy and style rather than
fundamental disagreements on matters of law." His assessment probably
was correct. The American Civil Liberties Union, however, thought that the
Administration's interpretation of the guidelines granted "overly broad
16
authority" to the FBI.
In December 1974, Seymour Hersh's New York Times articles accused
the CIA of wholesale violations of its charter and of the law, as a result of
its massive involvement in domestic political-intelligence activities. Hersh
based his disclosures on the CIA's internal inquiry into some questionable
operations, an inquiry ordered by Director James Schlesinger in 1973.
Those activities, subsequently dubbed the "Family Jewels," included not
only domestic intelligence activities, but also such questionable legal and
moral policies as the assassination of foreign leaders.
The Hersh revelations were eagerly seized upon by the newly-elected
members of the Ninety-fourth Congress, who felt committed to restoring an

16. The Levi Guidelines are reprinted in

STAFF OF SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE

383-402; ATiAN
G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART Cox, THE Boss: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT
AMERICAN INQUISITION 431-35 (1988); AP DISPATCH, IN WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Oct.
14, 1984; Leslie M. Werner, Lawyers'Panel Would Limit F.B.I 's Inquiriesinto Groups,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1985, at A13.
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
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ethical compass to governmental affairs in the wake of Watergate. Many
of the new congressional members, as well as the veterans, had campaigned
against abuses of official power and had promised a new direction. William
Colby, Schlesinger's successor, perceived that the "radically altered nature
of the Congress" gave focus to increasing demands to harness and control
his agency. President Ford attempted to preempt Congress when he
appointed a commission, chaired by Vice President Rockefeller, to investigate CIA activities. But three weeks later, the Senate and the House
each authorized a select committee to conduct an investigation of CIA operations.
'The Year of Intelligence had begun," a Senate staffer wrote, and the
long, cozy relationship between Congress and the CIA came to a halt. "All
the tensions and suspicions and hostilities that had been building about the
CIA since the Bay of Pigs, and had risen to a combustible level during the
Vietnam and Watergate years, now exploded," Colby remarked. 7
Years later, in seeming innocence, Nixon praised Richard Helms, the
CIA Director he had so summarily sacked for, among other things, his
failure to fully cooperate in the Watergate cover-up. Nixon deplored Helms'
subsequent criminal conviction for lying to Congress-"great injustice,"
Nixon called it-for Helms, he said, simply had been carrying out a
presidential assignment. Nixon went on to denounce the "attempt to castrate
the CIA in the mid-seventies [as] a national tragedy." But Helms dismissed
Nixon's hypocrisy, for the former Director had "no doubt that the whole
Watergate business fueled" the CIA's difficulty with Congress. Nixon's
attempt to entangle the CIA in Watergate, Helms contended, had been 'the
battering ram" for the subsequent congressional inquiry.18
The Rockefeller Commission, the Senate investigation headed by
Senator Frank Church (D-ID), and the House inquiry chaired by Otis Pike
(D-NY), highlighted the "black" side of CIA activities. But the image that
most clearly emerged in the public eye was Howard Baker's depiction of the
CIA as a "rogue elephant," an agency that had operated without authorization or audit, either by Congress or the President. Baker's characterization
seemed innocent; yet to put all the blame on the Agency masked the reality
that if neither Congress nor the President knew what the CIA was doing, it

17. Hersh's articles first appeared in the New York Times on December 22, 1974. The
best account of the politics of the Senate hearings, and the Senate's findings, is in LOCH K.
JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 9-11 (1985);
Interview with William Colby, Director (Oct. 9, 1987).
18. Interview with Richard Helms, Director of the C.I.A. (July 14, 1988 & Sept. 23,
1988).
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was because neither wanted to know.
The resulting uproar over the revelations led to two results. First, the
CIA itself now had an excuse to institute an internal housecleaning. Both
Colby and his successor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, forced the resignation
and retirement of bureaucratic barons who had built great power bases of
their own, often independent of the Director. Second, Congress developed
a greater interest in oversight and established the institutional means to that
end.
Hersh's reports spurred Congress to pass the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
at the end of 1975, requiring the President to approve and report all covert
operations to Congress. Two years later the Senate formalized the
procedure by establishing a standing committee for oversight of the
intelligence agencies, and the House followed a year later. Executive orders
by President Carter tightened the guidelines on domestic intelligence
activities, including a requirement that the CIA obtain warrants from the
Attorney General to carry on surveillance activities within the United States.
In October 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, which, among other things required that the CIA obtain court orders
to wiretap. Two years later, the Intelligence Oversight Act provided new
requirements that the CIA report to Congress on its covert activities.
Executive orders are subject to new executive orders, however;
relations between the CIA and the Attorney General are subject to the
compatibility of their interests; and congressional oversight is dependent,
first, on what information the CIA or the President chooses to provide, and
second, on the extent of Congress' own vigilance and interest. President
Reagan's Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, substantially
weakened Carter's 1978 directives and restored a large measure of discretion
to CIA activities. (That order also upset the Levi Guidelines on the FBI
and, in general, "unleashed" the intelligence agencies, as the President
noted.) The Iran-Contra affair in 1986-87 demonstrated that the CIA and
the Administration had acted without congressional consultation and hence
lacked that degree of consent that might have provided some cover of
legitimacy to what clearly was a dubious enterprise. The result was
predictable; renewed demands to force full CIA disclosure of its activities
were followed by expressions of concern that the CIA not be inhibited or
compromised in its activities.
When FBI Director William H. Webster moved to head the CIA in
March 1987, he remarked wistfully that the "post-Watergate period .. .
included some very searching and at times devastating inquiries that affected
not only us [the FBI] but the other components of the intelligence community." Reagan's CIA Director, William Casey, undoubtedly agreed, and when
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he proceeded to act on the premise that congressional oversight inquiries and
their conclusions mattered not a whit, no one effectively challenged him.
During his tenure, Casey readily secured presidential authorization for
aggressive covert operations, and he consistently proved uncooperative with
congressional oversight committees. Only the Iran-Contra fiasco and
Casey's death emboldened critics to demand more effective control again.19
In an immediate sense, Watergate altered public perception of the
presidency and the relationship between the executive and other institutions.
How much of those changes has endured, however, is questionable.
Watergate transformed and reshaped American attitudes toward government,
and especially the presidency, more than any single event since the Great
Depression of the 1930s, when Americans looked to the President as a
Moses to lead them out of the economic wilderness. World War II and the
Cold War, with their attendant dangers to the physical and ideological
security of the nation, only exalted that faith. Professor Woodrow Wilson,
who often expressed his low opinion of Congress, wrote in 1908 that the
presidency "must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the
world.... We have but begun to see the presidential office in this light;
"...20
but it is the light which will more and more beat upon it .
Intellectuals, liberal and conservative alike, celebrated Wilson's
prophecy. "The President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten thousand
tiny cords nor even a Prometheus chained to a rock of frustration," political
scientist Clinton Rossiter wrote in the late 1950s. "He is rather a kind of
magnificent lion, who can roam widely and do great deeds, so long as he
does not try to break loose from his broad reservation .... He will feel few
checks upon his power if he uses that power as he should." John F.
Kennedy's election in 1960 made that a canonical doctrine of the liberal
faith. But by the end of the decade, such glorifications of the presidency
seemed embarrassing (when they were not forgotten), and Rossiter's
restraints, largely written in as an afterthought, became the new gospel.2'
Watergate bestowed a new vulnerability on the presidency. Americans

19. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 195-96, 252-56, 263; Stansfield Turner, A Letter to
WilliamH. Webster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1987, at A35; Ronald J. Ostrow, WebsterChosen
as C.L.A. Director;PresidentPicks F.B.L Chief to Head Agency Under Firefor Iran Role,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987, § 1, at 1; see generally STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND
DEMOCRACY (1985).
20. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 78
(1908).
21. GODFREY HODGSON, ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN: THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 71, 76 (1980).
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alternately inflicted anger and derision on the office and the man. Ford's
pardon of Nixon added an element of cynicism. Slander and malice toward
presidents, of course, was not new. Washington suffered his share, as did
Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. But the invective now appeared on a massive scale. Once peerless and invincible, presidential
majesty seemed diminished, and Nixon and his immediate successors served
as easy prey for cruel, contemptuous humor. The media criticism of the
presidency, and the preoccupation with presidential sins of omission or
commission, had gathered such momentum in the Nixon years that it seemed
impossible to turn off the spigot. Jimmy Carter fared no better; indeed, his
self-avowed status as an outsider, his mannerisms, and his alternating shifts
between doubt and assured faith provided tailor-made targets for equally
biting humor and criticism. The Ford and Carter Administrations, especially, offered the spectacle of president as victim.
Clinton Rossiter notwithstanding, the President of the United States
now appeared to be an immobilized Gulliver-or worse yet, a Lilliputian.
"A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government."
Hamilton wrote in FederalistNo. 70. "A feeble execution is but another
phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may
be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government." By the end of the
1970s, the nation seemed to view its government as "feeble," and hence
"bad."
Although Watergate gave rise to the criticism of the "imperial presidency," the leitmotifin the early Reagan years was that the nation could ill
afford a crippled Chief Executive. Ford spoke of an "imperiled Presidency."
Yet power and authority were not so much at issue during the Watergate
years as were responsibility and accountability. Richard Nixon endlessly
stressed the importance, the infallibility, and the uniqueness of the "Presidency"--reiteration designed, it seemed, to insulate the President from accountability. Nothing in the historical traditions of executive power, nothing
in the Constitution, nothing even in the modem celebrations of executive
authority justified Nixon's rationalizations. Indeed, had he acknowledged
responsibility for Watergate, Nixon might have had a different fate. The
President's foes-and the nation-needed more than he offered. Nixon had
underestimated the historical tradition of skepticism toward unrestrained
power.22
22. Louis
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has many useful insights in qualifying the criticism of the "Imperial Presidency."
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In subsequent years, references to Nixon's deeds and the Watergate
controversy became a shorthand for amorality, abuse of power, and official
criminality. In turn, Watergate encouraged a routinized-some would argue
a trivialized--response to official breaches of public law and confidence.
A succession of congressional investigations, special prosecutors, and media
pressures followed the various allegations, some well founded, some not.
Watergate established historical traces as standards for future political
behavior. For those who thought the scandal a "dim and distant curiosity,"
the Iran-Contra affair in 1986-87 offered a rude reminder. The Reagan Administration's secret shipment of weapons to Iran, clearly intended as
ransom for American hostages held there, and the diversion of profits to the
Contra rebels in Nicaragua vividly revived the memories, the lessons, and
even the language of Watergate, sometimes inappropriately so. Almost instantaneously, the media raised the familiar Howard Baker question: "What
did the President know, and when did he know it?"
Watergate veterans weighed in with experienced advice. Alexander
Haig urged President Reagan to take responsibility for the scandal and
immediately dismiss underlings suspected of violating the laws. The
President, he continued, should refuse to appoint a special prosecutor, nor
should he allow congressional hearings (as if it were in his power to bar
them). Finally, Haig thought Reagan should tell the American people:
"And if you don't like it, impeach me!" He later lamented that Reagan did
not follow his advice and instead "went along with a six-month orgy" of
independent-counsel investigations and congressional hearings. Richard
Nixon told Reagan that the affair would not be "another Watergate, as long
as you stay ahead of the curve." More familiar language: Thirteen years
earlier, he had told Assistant Attorney General Petersen that he wanted "to
stay one step ahead of the curve."23
Reagan and his advisers had learned a great deal from the Watergate
experience. The President appointed the Tower Commission to investigate
the Iran-Contra affair. He generally cooperated, and more importantly, gave
the appearance of cooperation (if not of truthfulness). He never asserted
executive privilege; he instructed relevant agencies and individuals to
cooperate with Congress and with the independent counsel he appointed
(ignoring Haig), and even made available to the congressional committee

23. "1988, in Washington at least, was the year of the pig. Not since the Watergate
scandal and its aftermath has concern with the ethics of public officials reached such a
feverish pitch," Terence Moran, The New Breed ofEthicsScandal, LEGAL TnMEs, Dec. 19,
1988, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1988; NEwSWEEK, Dec. 22, 1986, at 17; Tape Transcript, the
President and Petersen, Apr. 15, 1973, UnitedStatesv. Mitchellmaterials,National Archives.
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material held by his designated biographer as well as extracts from his
personal diaries. One congressman, however, was unimpressed and thought
the Reagan Administration had learned a different lesson from Watergate:
"they learned to destroy as much evidence as possible and to appear
cooperative." The next perpetrators of misdeeds, he thought, would do
"even better" at covering their tracks.
The Iran-Contra affair may or may not have been a greater threat to the
American constitutional order than had Watergate, yet its d6nouement was
not nearly as dramatic. Reagan undoubtedly suffered a loss of credibility,
but unlike Nixon he retained a substantial measure of public trust. For
some, nevertheless, there was a sinister aspect in what was perceived as the
privatization of foreign policy by the White House and the adventurism of
presidential subordinates. More than anything, perhaps, the affair revealed
the shortcomings of Reagan's careless management style. But the congressional inquiry demonstrated that the constitutional arrangements for shared
governance remained contested ground in the American system. And within
those conflicts, as within that system, "trust," as Secretary of State George
Shultz admitted, "is the coin of the realm."24 Watergate sounded its
haunting tones throughout the episode.
Watergate became a permanent part of the American political language
after 1972, but its meaning could be easily forgotten. At a 1978 press
conference, a reporter asked President Jimmy Carter if he would consider
reducing or withholding federal revenue-sharing funds from those cities or
states that did not follow his wage guidelines. "I think this would be illegal
under the present law," the President said. The reporter, as if oblivious to
Nixon's extra-legal policies, persisted and repeated the question. "No,"
Carter responded very firmly, "we could not do that under the present law."
Yet for others, Watergate was more instructive. In 1983, revelations
indicated that the Solicitor General's office had suppressed evidence that
might have helped the cause of the Japanese-Americans when the Supreme
Court heard arguments in 1944 regarding the constitutionality of their

24. REPORT OF TIE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFA R, H.R. REP. No. 100, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1987), S.R. REP. No. 100, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1987); Elizabeth Drew, Letterfrom Washington, THE NEW YORKER,
Aug. 31, 1987, at 89; Theodore Draper's articles on the Iran-Contra affair in The New York
ReviewofBooks, October 8,22, December 17, 1987, are especially insightful. The literature
is growing on the Iran-Contra controversy. Harper'sFebruaryand April 1988, offered some
interesting critiques and debates on the congressional report. A thoughtful analysis is Harold
Hongju Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in ForeignAffairs: Lessons of the
Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
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wartime internment. A Justice Department attorney, who later went on to
a distinguished career as a civil libertarian, was asked some forty years later
why he had not publicly exposed the alleged chicanery when he found
himself tormented between conscience and loyalty to superiors in 1944.
"Watergate," he responded, "hadn't happened yet."25 With President
Clinton embroiled in a controversy over his allegedly questionable private
business dealings, the Republican House leader complained that the
President's behavior was "Nixonish."
Watergate, on the whole, has lingered in public memory. The public
traditionally has been disposed to expect the worst of legislators "and at the
same time believe in the high virtues of the president and his entourage."26
But for a while, at least, the situation has been reversed. When the
expectation of executive virtue is disappointed, the weight of such
disappointment almost inevitably produces a massive response which,
however naively, attempts to ensure against any repetition of executive
offenses. Some of the resulting measures succeed; some amount to little
more than an exercise in futility or wrongheadedness. And so, the judgment
of the effectiveness of post-Watergate reforms results is a mixed verdict.
Perhaps above all, however, Watergate revitalized and nourished the
tradition of constitutional responsibility. It also elevated moral considerations in the judgment of public officers and in the conduct of public
business. Whether involving limitations on campaign funds, ethical
standards for elected and appointed officials, governmental intervention in
the private sphere, or the conduct of foreign policy, a national consciousness
of the need of checks on powerholders was sparked by Watergate. That
concern has remained vital in the years since, prompting both legislation and
criticism that reinforced some standards for the proper conduct of political
leaders and governmental officials. However excessive, faulty, or even
misguided the responses to Watergate may have been, they reflected an
understanding that public officials must themselves adhere to the same rule
of law they so piously demand that the governed obey. What is not
acceptable is Nixon's 1977 rationalization that "when the President does it,
that means that it is not illegal."27 Richard Nixon's most ardent and
passionate defenders must either agree, or defend the alien proposition that
a president is above the law.

25. PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1978, at 2224 (December 12, 1978); PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR 351 (1983).
26. FISHER, supra note 22, at 333.
27. FROST, supra note 5, at 183.
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